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Note 
EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. v. LEWIS: SINGLED OUT BY 
CORPORATIONS AND A TEXTUALIST SUPREME COURT, 
AMERICAN WORKERS ARE LEFT TO FEND FOR THEMSELVES 
GRACE O’MALLEY∗ 
In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (“Epic”),1 the United States Supreme 
Court considered whether employer-drafted arbitration agreements requiring 
employees to individually arbitrate disputes and thus barring collective legal 
actions were enforceable.  The Court’s decision turned on whether arbitration 
agreements barring collective claims conflicted with the National Labor Re-
lations Act’s (“NLRA”) guarantees for workers to engage in “concerted ac-
tivities for . . . mutual aid or protection.”2  In Part I, this Note will discuss the 
three cases3 addressed by the decision in Epic.  Part II will examine the lan-
guage, history, and interpretations of the two statutes at issue: the NLRA and 
the Federal Arbitration Act4 (“FAA”).5  Part III will review the five-justice 
majority’s decision in Epic,6 which held that the employer-drafted agree-
ments were enforceable because the NLRA does not contain an express in-
tention to displace the FAA, the NLRA does not guarantee workers a right to 
collective legal action,7 and, therefore, the arbitration agreements at issue 
should be enforced according to their terms.8  Part IV of this Note will argue 
this decision improperly narrowed the rights of workers using textualist anal-
ysis in a manner that was inconsistent with the intent of the NLRA9 and the 
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 1.  138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 2.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 3.  See infra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 4.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012).  
 5.  Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1632. 
 6.  Id. at 1618. 
 7.  Id. at 1628–30.  
 8.  Id. at 1619.  
 9.  See infra Section IV.A. 
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FAA.10  This decision erroneously expanded the scope of the FAA by defin-
ing arbitration as presumptively bilateral11 rather than collective in nature 
even though this contention lacks support in the history and text of the FAA.12  
On a policy level, this decision will have the unfortunate effect of hindering 
workers’ ability to enforce federal protections while insulating corporations 
and unscrupulous employers from liability.13 
I.  THE CASE 
In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Supreme Court addressed three 
cases involving wage-and-hour disputes between employees and employers: 
Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp.,14 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB,15 and Morris 
v. Ernst & Young.16  Employers in each case sought to enforce arbitration 
agreements barring collective legal actions so that employees may only indi-
vidually arbitrate employment disputes with employers.17  The employees 
contended18 these agreements were unenforceable since the NLRA guaran-
tees workers a right to “concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protec-
tion.”19  However, opponents of this view contended that the NLRA’s guar-
antees only protect unionization and collective bargaining in the workplace, 
not collective legal action, and the FAA protects arbitration agreements from 
judicial interference.20 
In April of 2014, employees of Epic Systems Corporation (“Epic”), in-
cluding Mr. Lewis, received an email from their employer.21  The email con-
tained an arbitration agreement that barred class, collective, and representa-
tive claims, mandating instead that employees could only bring wage-and-
hour claims through individual arbitration.22  Thus, while employees could 
still bring wage-and-hour claims against the employer, employees could only 
                                                          
 10.  See infra Section IV.B.  
 11.  The Court’s FAA jurisprudence has defined “bilateral” arbitration as dispute resolution 
that involves only the parties to a single arbitration agreement, rather than a process that could 
resolve similar claims arising out of multiple arbitration agreements.  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal-
Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010).   
 12.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 13.  See infra Section IV.C.  
 14.  823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 15.  808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 16.  834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 17.  See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619–20 (2018) (describing the dispute in 
Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris, where the employer sought to prevent the employee from bringing a 
class claim, as the typical issue arising in each of the three cases addressed in Epic). 
 18.  Id. at 1624.  
 19.  Id. at 1619–20, 1624 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)).  
 20.  Id. at 1620.  
 21.  Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 22.  Id.  
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do so in an arbitral forum (as opposed to a judicial forum) and in individual-
ized proceedings.23  The email further stipulated that employees would be 
deemed to have accepted the agreement if they continued to work at Epic.24  
However, the email requested that employees review and accept the agree-
ment by clicking two buttons.25  Epic provided no option to decline the agree-
ment if employees wanted to keep their jobs.26  The next day, Mr. Lewis 
followed the email’s instructions for registering his agreement.27 
Later, a dispute arose between Mr. Lewis and Epic, in which Mr. Lewis 
contended that Epic misclassified him and other workers in violation of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),28 and thereby unlawfully deprived them 
of overtime pay.29  Mr. Lewis did not proceed under the arbitration agree-
ment.30  Instead, Mr. Lewis brought a representative action against Epic in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.31  The 
employer moved to dismiss and to compel individual arbitration,32 but the 
district court found that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it 
interfered with employees’ rights under Section 7 of the NLRA.33  On appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision.34  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the ordinary mean-
ing of “concerted activities” in Section 7 of the NLRA encompasses a right 
to collective, representative, or class dispute resolution.35  Since the FAA 
permits the invalidation of arbitration agreements based on ordinary contract 
defenses, such as illegality, the Court reasoned that the FAA did not mandate 
enforcement of Epic’s agreement to individually arbitrate because its provi-
sions violated the NLRA.36  In other words, the arbitration agreements were 
unenforceable and could be set aside under the FAA’s saving clause because 
the agreements conflicted with the rights granted by a federal statute.37 
                                                          
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id.  Even if Mr. Lewis had not signaled his acceptance with the click of those two buttons, 
he would have been deemed to have constructively accepted the agreement if he continued in his 
employment with Epic.  Id.  Essentially, the choice presented to Mr. Lewis was quit his job or accept 
his employer’s arbitration agreement.  Id.   
 28.  29 U.S.C. § 201–204, 206, 207, 209–219 (2012).  
 29.  Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1151. 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id at 1150–51.  
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 1161.  
 35.  Id. at 1152–53.  
 36.  Id. at 1159 (“Illegality is a standard contract defense contemplated by the FAA’s saving 
clause.”).  
 37.  Id.  
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Similarly, in Morris v. Ernst & Young, an employee brought a collective 
action against the accounting firm Ernst & Young for alleged violations of 
the FLSA despite an agreement to individually arbitrate employment dis-
putes.38  The federal district court granted Ernst & Young’s motion to compel 
individual arbitration and dismissed the case.39  On appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district 
court’s decision.40  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the NLRA, consistent 
with congressional intent and the National Labor Relations Board’s 
(“NLRB”) interpretation,41 guarantees workers a substantive right to bring 
claims collectively.42  Since the right to collective action is a substantive fed-
eral right,43 the FAA did not mandate the enforcement of the agreements in 
this case.44  Accordingly, the court found Ernst & Young’s mandatory arbi-
tration agreement requiring that claims be brought individually and sepa-
rately was unenforceable.45 
In Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, the employer, Murphy Oil, petitioned 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review of the 
NLRB’s decision that Murphy Oil’s arbitration agreement constituted an un-
fair labor practice.46  In 2010, employees of Murphy Oil filed a collective 
action against Murphy Oil in federal district court alleging violations of the 
FLSA, despite the fact that the employees had signed an agreement to indi-
vidually arbitrate claims against Murphy Oil.47  The NLRB held that the em-
ployer-drafted agreement to individually48 arbitrate disputes violated the 
                                                          
 38.  Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016).  Mr. Morris and other 
employees, as a condition of their employment, were required to sign a “concerted action waiver,” 
which required employees to pursue claims exclusively through arbitration and exclusively as indi-
viduals in “separate proceedings.”  Id. 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. at 990. 
 41.  In Morris, the Ninth Circuit noted that the NLRB’s interpretations of the NLRA are ac-
corded Chevron deference, which means that reviewing courts will defer to the NLRB’s “reasonable 
interpretations” of the NLRA.  Id. at 980–81 (first citing Chevron, USA, Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 & n.9 (1984); then citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v. 
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 143–44 (2002)).   
 42.  Id. at 980–83. 
 43.  Id. at 983 (citing Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978)).  
 44.  Id. at 985–86 (“The problem with the contract at issue is not that it requires arbitration; it 
is that the contract term defeats a substantive federal right to pursue concerted work-related legal 
claims.”).  
 45.  Id. at 990.  
 46.  Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 47.  Id. at 1015.  
 48.  But see Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 774, 774–75, 781–82, 789–90 (2014) (noting 
that while mandatory arbitration agreements requiring employees to individually arbitrate claims 
are invalid under the NLRA, mandatory arbitration agreements that allow employees to pursue 
claims collectively are valid and conform with the NLRA).  
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NLRA and was, therefore, unenforceable.49  The NLRB found that the agree-
ments violate the NLRA because they require employees to forfeit their sub-
stantive right to act collectively.50  To address the argument that the arbitra-
tion agreements should be enforced in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,51 which barred consumers 
from bringing classwide arbitration, the NLRB found that Concepcion in-
volved federal preemption of a state law, while  the question of whether col-
lective action waivers for employment disputes were enforceable involved a 
conflict of two federal statutes.  In Murphy Oil, the Fifth Circuit declined to 
enforce the NLRB’s order,52 and reaffirmed its position that employer-
drafted agreements to individually arbitrate claims are enforceable.53  The 
Fifth Circuit reiterated the reasoning provided in its earlier decision in D.R. 
Horton, Inc. v. NLRB54: “(1) [T]he NLRA does not contain a ‘congressional 
command overriding’ the [FAA]; and (2) ‘use of class action procedures . . . 
is not a substantive right’ under Section 7 of the NLRA.”55 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine a question in com-
mon to these three cases: Whether employer-drafted agreements to individu-
ally arbitrate employment disputes violate the NLRA and are, therefore, un-
enforceable.56 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Arbitration as a dispute resolution method has become commonplace in 
a variety of contexts57 and has been significantly bolstered by Supreme Court 
decisions over the past twenty years.58  Arbitration’s proponents on the Court 
                                                          
 49.  Id. at 794.  A year prior to the Board’s decision in Murphy Oil, however, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected this analysis in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB and held a similar 
agreement to individually arbitrate claims enforceable.  Murphy Oil, 808 F.3d at 1016–17 (citing 
D.R. Horton, Inc., v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013)).   
 50.  Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. at 774–75. 
 51.  563 U.S. 333 (2011) 
 52.  Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 808 F.3d at 1021. 
 53.  Id. at 1016.  
 54.  737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).  
 55.  Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 808 F.3d at 1016 (footnote omitted) (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc., v. 
NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357, 360–62 (5th Cir. 2013)).  
 56.  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619–20 (2018). 
 57.  E.g., BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION, CFPB-2016-0020, FINAL RULE; OFFICIAL 
INTERPRETATIONS 6 (2016) https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201707_cfpb_Arbitra-
tion-Agreements-Rule.pdf (“In the last few decades, companies have begun inserting arbitration 
agreements in a wide variety of standard-form contracts, such as in contracts between companies 
and consumers, employees, and investors.”) .  
 58.  See infra Section II.A. 
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have hailed arbitration as an efficient alternative forum for dispute resolu-
tion,59 while its critics have pointed to concerns about arbitration’s exculpa-
tory effects in situations involving unequal bargaining power.60  This tension 
between arbitration’s efficiency and exculpatory effect has animated recent 
debates regarding arbitration of statutory claims in employment contracts.61 
The Supreme Court’s generous interpretations of the FAA62 have col-
lided63 with the NLRA’s broadly worded right of workers to engage in col-
lective action for “mutual aid or protection”64 in employer-drafted collective 
action waivers.65  Section II.A examines the FAA’s origins, interpretations, 
and scope.  Section II.B discusses the legislative intent and force of the 
NLRA.  Section II.C surveys the opinions of the NLRB and lower courts 
discussing whether collective action waivers in the employment context are 
enforceable in light of the NLRA’s guarantees for workers. 
A.  The Federal Arbitration Act’s History and Scope 
Arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism has been 
strengthened over the past century through the enactment of the  FAA,66 
which was principally supported by trade associations and commercial 
                                                          
 59.  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344–45 (2011) (“And the 
informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of 
dispute resolution.” (first citing 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009); then citing 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).  
 60.  See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 240–42 (2013) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (explaining how American Express’ arbitration agreement with restauranteurs, which 
barred collective claims, effectively prevented the restauranteurs from bringing federal antitrust 
claims and, therefore, insulated American Express from liability); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 365–66 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting terms in arbitration clauses in “consumer contracts can be manipu-
lated to insulate an agreement’s author from liability for its own frauds”).  
 61.  See infra Section II.C. 
 62.  See infra Section II.A.3.  
 63.  See Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 774, 774–75 (2014) (citing D.R. Horton, Inc., 
357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012)), for a discussion of the relatively recent collision of the two federal 
statutes and scholarly and judicial reactions to the NLRB’s first decision to address the apparent 
conflict, D.R. Horton, Inc.  
 64.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 65.  See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (explaining that the Court’s 
role is to harmonize the apparently conflicting statutes).  A collective action waiver, in the employ-
ment context, is a provision contained in an employer-drafted contract with its employees that bars 
joint, group, class, collective, and representative claims, mandating instead that employment claims 
can only be brought individually.  See, e.g., id. at 1622 (discussing the effect of collective action 
waivers in employment-related disputes).  
 66.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012). 
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groups as a way to resolve business disputes,67 and the Court’s favorable in-
terpretations of the FAA’s provisions.68  Arbitration is a “dispute-resolution 
process in which the disputing parties choose one or more neutral third parties 
to make a final and binding decision resolving the dispute,”69 and it is often 
used to foreclose access to traditional court room processes.70  Congress en-
acted the FAA in 1925, in response to the reluctance of courts to enforce such 
agreements that limited the jurisdiction of courts to resolve disputes.71  The 
primary provision72 of the FAA is contained in Section 2,73 which states, 
“[A]n agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”74  Since its enactment, the Supreme Court 
has expanded the scope of the FAA beyond Congress’s initial design.75 
                                                          
 67.  Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 409 n.2 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (first citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 3, 7, 9, 10 (1923); then citing Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 
Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7 (1924)).  
 68.  See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231, 238–39 (2013) (find-
ing that the plaintiffs’ federal antitrust claims were subject to individual arbitration per an agreement 
between American Express and individual restauranteurs even though the cost of bringing the 
claims individually was prohibitively high); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 
340, 352 (2011) (finding that a California law prohibiting certain collective action waivers in liti-
gation and arbitration was preempted by the FAA).  
 69.  Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 70.  Id. (citing JOHN P.H. SOPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATIONS 
AND AWARDS 1 (David M. Lawrence ed., 5th ed. 1935)). 
 71.  C.f., Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 593 (2008) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (explaining that prior to the enactment of the FAA, “American courts were generally hostile 
to arbitration” and often refused to order specific enforcement of arbitration agreements).  American 
courts had traditionally refused the notion that arbitration agreements could supplant courtroom 
dispute resolution and “oust the courts of jurisdiction.”  Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 F. 
405, 409–10 (9th Cir. 1923).  
 72.  See, e.g., Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Section 2 of the FAA is the “centerpiece of the FAA,” which “reflects Congress’ main goal in pass-
ing the legislation: ‘to abrogate the general common-law rule against specific enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements.’” (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part)).  
 73.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  See infra Sections II.A.2, II.A.3.  
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1.  Congress Initially Envisioned Arbitration as Proper only Under 
a Narrow Set of Conditions 
At the time of the FAA’s enactment, Congress envisioned arbitration as 
a voluntarily negotiated agreement used primarily to address commercial dis-
putes between merchants.76  Although arbitration has since been expanded to 
consumer and employment contracts, “Congress did not intend to allow bind-
ing arbitration agreements on individuals if the contracts were between par-
ties of unequal bargaining power.”77  Justice Breyer explained that Congress 
thought “arbitration would be used primarily where merchants sought to re-
solve disputes of fact, not law, under the customs of their industries, where 
the parties possessed roughly equivalent bargaining power.”78 
In fact, the FAA’s passage may have been due in part to Congress’s 
assurances that the FAA would not apply to contracts between employers and 
employees.79  When organized labor expressed opposition to the FAA based 
on its fears that arbitration could be applied to employment contracts, the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) committee that drafted the legislation 
and then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover suggested adding language 
to exclude employment contracts from the FAA.80  Following then-Secretary 
Hoover’s suggestion, the FAA was reintroduced with the exclusionary lan-
guage in Section 1.81  Consequently, organized labor withdrew its opposition 
to the bill.82  Specifically, the exclusionary language of Section 1 states, 
“[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of sea-
men, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
                                                          
 76.  H.R. REP. NO. 111-712, at 55 n.128 (2011); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 409 n.2 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Practically all who testified in 
support of the bill before the Senate subcommittee in 1923 explained that the bill was designed to 
cover contracts between people in different States who produced, shipped, bought, or sold commod-
ities.”).  
 77.  H.R. REP. NO. 111-712, at 55–56 (2011); see Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 413–14 
(Black, J., dissenting) (noting that the draftsman of the FAA assured members of Congress that the 
FAA would only apply to voluntarily negotiated agreements).  
 78.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 362 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US 614, 650 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that historically arbitration has been used in “ordinary disputes between mer-
chants as to questions of fact” (quoting Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 415 (Black, J., dissenting))). 
 79.  See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 414 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Senator Walsh cited in-
surance, employment, construction, and shipping contracts as routinely containing arbitration 
clauses and being offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees. . . .  He 
was emphatically assured by the supporters of the bill that it was not their intention to cover such 
cases.” (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 67th Cong., 3, 7, 9, 10 (1923)). 
 80.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 126–27 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th 
Cong, 9 (1923)).  
 81.  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 82.  Circuit City Stores. Inc., 532 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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interstate commerce.”83  Thus, the language and history of the FAA indicate 
that Congress originally intended arbitration to occur under a narrow set of 
conditions, primarily in a commercial context. 
2.  The Court Has Expanded the FAA’s Scope Beyond the Text and 
Legislative Intent of the FAA in Recent Decades 
The Court has held arbitration agreements enforceable in employment 
disputes84 and in disputes involving federal statutory claims.85  In Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,86 the majority held that an employee’s claims 
under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)87 were 
subject to compulsory arbitration under the FAA88 based on the Court’s then-
recent decisions sanctioning arbitration of federal statutory claims.89  Addi-
tionally, the majority found ADEA claims were arbitrable because the ADEA 
“did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of 
claims,”90 and unequal bargaining power between employees and employers 
“is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never en-
forceable in the employment context.”91  The majority’s opinion did not ad-
dress the exclusionary language in Section 1 of the FAA, nor did it directly 
address whether the FAA applies to employment contracts.92 
It was not until 2001 in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams93 that a five-
justice majority adopted a narrow construction of Section 1’s exclusionary 
language94 and held the only employment contracts exempt from the FAA’s 
                                                          
 83.  9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 84.  See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (upholding an arbi-
tration agreement between a registered securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”)); Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 119 (upholding an arbitration agreement contained 
in an employment application of a sales associate at a national electronics retailer); see also EEOC 
v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (recognizing that employment contracts, except 
those of transportation workers, are covered by the FAA).  
 85.  See infra note 89.  
 86.  500 U.S. 20 (1991).  
 87.  29 U.S.C. §§ 621–633, 633a, 634 (2012).  
 88.  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.  
 89.  Id. at 26 (first citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614 (1985); then citing Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987); and 
then citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1989)).  
 90.  Id. at 29.  
 91.  Id. at 32–33.  
 92.  Id. at 25 n.2 (asserting that since the arbitration clause was contained in a securities regis-
tration agreement between a securities representative and the NYSE and not an employment con-
tract, the Court would not address the scope of the exclusionary language in Section 1 of the FAA).  
 93.  532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 94.  Id. at 119.   
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provisions were those of transportation workers.95  To arrive at this conclu-
sion, the Court employed the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construc-
tion, which directs that general words appearing at the end of a list to be 
construed narrowly so as to embrace only objects similar to the preceding 
terms.96  The Court reasoned that because the phrase “any other class of 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” appears after specific 
references to the exclusion of “seamen” and “railroad employees,”97 the gen-
eral terms should be construed narrowly to only embrace transportation 
workers.98  The Court, again employing textualist devices, reasoned that Con-
gress did not intend to provide a broad exemption for employment contracts 
because it used the words “engaged in . . . commerce”99 rather than more gen-
erous phraseology such as “involving commerce” or “affecting com-
merce.”100  From a policy perspective, the Court contended that arbitration in 
employment matters would be beneficial because it would allow parties to 
avoid the costs of litigation.101  The Court dismissed the historical argu-
ments102 that favored a more expansive view of Section 1’s exclusionary lan-
guage103 and explicitly declined to assess the legislative history of the exclu-
sionary provision to inform its judgment.104  With this decision, the Court 
narrowed the categories of contracts exempt from the FAA, and in doing so, 
expanded the scope of the FAA.105  Most importantly, this decision provided 
                                                          
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id. at 114–15. 
 97.  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
 98.  Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 114–15. 
 99.  9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 100.  Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 115–16 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995)).  
 101.  Id. at 123.  The Court argued that such cost avoidance would be particularly beneficial in 
employment disputes because these controversies often involve smaller sums of money than dis-
putes concerning commercial contracts.  Id.  
 102.  Id. at 125–29  (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he exclusion fully responded to the concerns 
of the Seamen’s Union and other labor organizations that § 2 might encompass employment con-
tracts by expressly exempting the labor agreements not only of ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees,’ 
but also of ‘any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.’” (quoting 9 
U.S.C. § 1)).  
 103.  The Court dismissed arguments that Section 1’s language was intended to broadly exempt 
employment contracts from the FAA because of organized labor’s initial fears about the legislation.  
Id. at 119–20 (majority opinion).  The Court asserted that the source used to support these argu-
ments, testimony before a Senate subcommittee, was too far “removed from the full Congress.”  Id. 
at 120.  The Court also contended that examining legislative history becomes “problematic” when 
reviewing courts “speculate upon the significance of the fact that a certain interest group sponsored 
or opposed particular legislation.”  Id. at 120. 
 104.  See id. at 119 (“As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text . . . we need not 
assess the legislative history of the exclusion provision.”).  
 105.  Id.  
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the concrete legal basis for employers to insert mandatory arbitration agree-
ments in employment contracts.106 
3.  The Court Has Bolstered Arbitration Clauses by Sanctioning 
Collective Action Waivers and Narrowing the FAA’s Saving 
Clause 
The Court’s recent decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion107 
and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant108 together permit 
collective action waivers in arbitration clauses even when these waivers make 
all permissible claims under the agreement economically and practically un-
feasible.109  In Concepcion,110 the Court held that a California state law pro-
hibiting consumer class action waivers on the basis of unconscionability111 is 
inconsistent with and preempted by the FAA.112  Section 2 of the FAA pro-
vides arbitration agreements can be set aside on grounds that exist for the 
revocation of any contract,113 which has been understood to include defenses 
such as “fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”114  Although contract law is 
defined by the states, and the state in this case held the waivers at issue un-
conscionable and unenforceable,115 the Court reasoned that a state law prohi-
bition on class action waivers was inconsistent with the FAA.116  The Court 
reasoned that the state law barring class action waivers for their inherent un-
                                                          
 106.  Id.  
 107.  563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011). 
 108.  570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
 109.  See infra notes 122–124 and accompanying text.  
 110.  AT&T customers filed a class action against the company in federal court alleging fraud 
and false advertising because the company had advertised a free phone with the purchase of AT&T 
services but charged customers $30.22 in sales tax for the phone.  563 U.S. at 337. 
 111.  This judicially created state law in California was known as the Discover Bank rule.  Under 
the Discover Bank rule, consumer class action waivers in contracts of adhesion in which disputes 
between the contracting parties will predictably involve small amounts of damages are unconscion-
able and therefore unenforceable under California contract law.  The rule applies to class action 
waivers in arbitral as well as judicial forums.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 357–59 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). 
 112.  Id. at 348 (majority opinion).  
 113.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
 114.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 
687 (1996)).  
 115.  See supra note 111.  
 116.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339, 341–44.  The Court recognized that the FAA’s saving clause 
allows for arbitration agreements to be set aside based on traditional contract defenses, but noted 
that a defense cannot stand and cannot invalidate the agreement if the defense applies only to arbi-
tration, or derives its meaning from the fact that an arbitration agreement is at issue.  Id. at 341–42.   
The Court found that the Discover Bank rule disproportionately affected arbitration agreements, 
interfered with the FAA’s purposes, and was therefore invalid.  Id. at 342, 344, 346.  
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conscionability was inconsistent with the FAA’s general purpose of enforc-
ing arbitration agreements according to their terms.117  Furthermore, the 
Court asserted that a switch from bilateral to classwide arbitration interferes 
with the “fundamental attributes of arbitration,”118 namely its “efficient, 
streamlined procedures.”119  Bilateral arbitration involves only the parties to 
a single arbitration agreement, while collective and classwide arbitration in-
volves multiple arbitration agreements an entity has entered with consumers, 
employees, or other parties.120  Although collective legal actions practically 
may be necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims, which would be too small 
to justify the legal costs of pursuing the claim individually, the Court re-
sponded that “[s]tates cannot require [the availability of] a procedure . . . in-
consistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”121  
Thus, this decision sanctioned the unrestricted use of class action waivers in 
consumer arbitration agreements by invalidating a state law that sought to 
limit consumer class action waivers generally.122 
Two years later, in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restau-
rant,123 the Court decided that class action waivers could be enforced even if 
compliance with the waivers makes pursuing a claim economically unfeasi-
ble.124  The restaurant owners resisting individual arbitration invoked a judi-
cially-created exception to the FAA, the “effective vindication” doctrine, 
which harmonizes competing federal policies by allowing courts to invalidate 
agreements that prevent the effective vindication of a federal statutory 
                                                          
 117.  The Court asserted that the principal purpose of the FAA is to enforce arbitration agree-
ments according to the terms the parties agreed to.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344.  The Court noted 
instances in which it has held that parties to an arbitration agreement may agree to limit the issues 
subject to arbitration, to arbitrate according to specific rules, and to limit with whom a party will 
arbitrate its disputes.  Id.  But see id. at 359–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that the purpose 
behind the FAA was to ensure judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements by merely putting 
agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts).  
 118.  Id. at 344, 347–48 (majority opinion).  
 119.  See id. (arguing that classwide arbitration would sacrifice the primary advantages of arbi-
tration because it would be costlier, since it involves higher stakes, and slower because of its at-
tendant procedural formalities such as class certification).  
 120.  See supra note 11.  For example, the bilateral nature of the arbitration agreement between 
AT&T and a customer was expressed with a provision that stated, “You and AT&T agree that each 
may bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or 
class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”  Brief for Petitioner at 27, AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893) (quoting Petitioner Appeal 61a). 
 121.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351.  
 122.  Id. at 352.  
 123.  In this case, restaurant owners, who accepted American Express cards from their patrons, 
had accepted an agreement with American Express that required claims be resolved in arbitration 
and prohibited the arbitration of claims on a class basis.  570 U.S. 228, 231 (2013).  The restaurant 
owners brought a class action against American Express alleging violations of antitrust laws, and 
American Express motioned to compel arbitration.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 235–36.  
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right.125  The Court disagreed with these arguments and found that federal 
antitrust laws did not contain a congressional command overriding the FAA 
or requiring the availability of aggregate claims.126  Additionally, the Court 
found that the effective vindication doctrine could only bar an arbitration 
agreement if the agreements prospectively waived a party’s ability to assert 
a statutory right or if the arbitration fees were so high as to make access to 
the forum impracticable.127  The Court asserted that the class action waiver 
at issue did not rise to this level of impracticability because it “merely 
limit[ed] arbitration to the two contracting parties.”128  In other words, the 
Court sanctioned the use of collective action waivers even when such waivers 
meant that the cost of prosecuting the individual claim exceeded the maxi-
mum recovery for an individual plaintiff.129 
B.  The National Labor Relations Act’s History and Scope 
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA in an effort to address “[t]he ine-
quality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-
dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are orga-
nized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association.”130  To 
effectuate this goal, the NLRA applies to almost131 all private sector employ-
ees,132 grants substantive rights to workers to engage in collective action, 133 
and provides for the enforcement of these rights.134  Section 7 enumerates 
substantive rights to collective action for workers: “Employees shall have the 
                                                          
 125.  Id. at 231.  The restaurateurs argued that the cost of proving their antitrust claims against 
American Express could exceed $1 million while the maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff 
would be a little below $40,000, making an aggregate legal action necessary for an affordable pros-
ecution of their claims.  Id. at 231, 235.   
 126.  Id. at 233–34.  
 127.  Id. at 236.  
 128.  Id. at 239.  The Court also argued that since class procedures were not included in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure until 1938 and previously individual proceedings had been the 
norm, individual proceedings could not now be considered “ineffective vindication.”  Id. at 236–
37.  
 129.  Id. at 236. 
 130.  29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); see also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 835 
(1984) (explaining that the NLRA was designed to “equalize the bargaining power of the employee 
with that of his employer by allowing employees to band together in confronting an employer re-
garding the terms and conditions of their employment”).  
 131.  The NLRA applies broadly to “any employee” and “shall not be limited to the employees 
of a particular employer,” but includes a few well-delineated exceptions.  29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  The 
NLRA specifically exempts agricultural laborers, those employed in the domestic service of a fam-
ily or person at their home, independent contractors, supervisors, “any individual employed by his 
parent or spouse . . . or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act.”  
Id.  
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. § 157. 
 134.  Id. § 158(a)(1). 
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right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.”135  Section 7 grants employees a variety of 
rights in order to carry out the NLRA’s express intent to address the “ine-
quality of bargaining power” between employees and employers.136  Mean-
while, Section 8 provides for the enforcement of these rights: “It shall be an 
unfair labor practice for an employer—(1) to interfere with, restrain, or co-
erce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this 
title.”137  To aid in the enforcement of workers’ rights, the NLRA created an 
independent agency, the NLRB.138  Congress granted the NLRB rulemak-
ing139 and adjudicatory140 authority to enforce the provisions of the NLRA.  
The statute sought to comprehensively address inequality in bargaining 
power between workers and their employers. 
In keeping with the comprehensive design of the statute, courts and the 
NLRB have interpreted Section 7’s guarantees broadly and upheld workers’ 
rights to collective action in a variety of contexts.  The Court in Eastex Inc. 
v. NLRB141 granted certiorari to address the differences among the circuits as 
to the scope of rights protected by the “mutual aid or protection” clause of 
Section 7 of the NLRA and explicitly rejected a narrow construction of this 
provision.142  The Court explained that “Congress knew . . . that labor’s cause 
often is advanced on fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance 
settlement within the immediate employment context.”143  Specifically, the 
Court noted that the phrase “mutual aid or protection” is meant to “protect[] 
employees from retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve 
working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums, and 
that employees’ appeals to legislators to protect their interests as employees 
are within the scope of this clause.”144 
Accordingly, courts and the NLRB have found Section 7’s concerted 
activities for “mutual aid or protection”145 guarantees workers the right to 
                                                          
 135.  Id. § 157. 
 136.  Id. § 151.  
 137.  Id. § 158(a)(1). 
 138.  Id. § 153. 
 139.  Id. § 156. 
 140.  Id. § 161. 
 141.  437 U.S. 556 (1978).  
 142.  Id. at 562; 29 U.S.C. § 157.  
 143.  Eastex Inc., 437 U.S. at 565.  
 144.  Id. at 565–66 (footnote omitted).  
 145.  29 U.S.C. § 157. 
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collectively lobby elected officials,146 the media,147 and, most relevant to the 
concerns here, to bring lawsuits on class and representative bases to improve 
working terms and conditions.148  Just seven years after the NLRA was en-
acted, the NLRB decided three employees’ collective legal action against 
their employer under the FLSA was protected under the NLRA since their 
legal action directly concerned wages and working conditions.149  Courts 
have also endorsed the view that collective legal action is protected under the 
NLRA.150  As recently as 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit reaffirmed this understanding in Brady v. National Football 
League151 when the court recognized “a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group 
of employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment 
is ‘concerted activity’ under [Section] 7 of the [NLRA].”152  Therefore, the 
NLRA has been designed and interpreted to comprehensively address une-
qual bargaining power between employees and employers in part by enforc-
ing a broad right to collective action on the part of the employees. 
C.  Collective Action Waivers in Employment: The NLRB’s 
Interpretation and the Circuit Split 
As arbitration has become more common and bolstered by favorable 
Supreme Court decisions in recent years,153 the NLRB and the courts have 
been presented with the question of whether collective action waivers conflict 
with Section 7’s guarantees.154  The NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA is 
                                                          
 146.  See, e.g., Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. Ltd. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1940) 
(enforcing the NLRB’s order to allow employees to collectively address the Massachusetts legisla-
ture because the right “guaranteed by Section 7 of the [NLRA], is not limited to direct collective 
bargaining with the employer, but extends to other activities for ‘mutual aid or protection,’ including 
appearance of employee representatives before legislative committees”).   
 147.  E.g., NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505–06 (2d Cir. 
1942) (finding that the union’s publication of its resolution condemning certain activities of its em-
ployer in local newspapers was protected under Section 7).  
 148.  See infra notes 149–152.  
 149.  Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942, 948–49 (1942).  
 150.  See, e.g., Leviton Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 1973) (“[F]iling of a 
labor related civil action by a group of employees is ordinarily a concerted activity protected by § 7, 
unless the employees acted in bad faith.”); NLRB v. Poultrymen’s Service Corp., 138 F.2d 204, 210 
(3d Cir. 1943) (enforcing the NLRB’s order which found in part that the employer was guilty of 
unfair labor practices by interfering with the workers attempts to bring collective legal action under 
the FLSA).  
 151.  644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).  
 152.  Id. at 673.  But see infra notes 176–183.  
 153.  See supra Section II.A.  
 154.  See infra notes 161–192 and accompanying text.  
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accorded judicial deference due to its expertise in employment and labor re-
lated issues.155  On the issue of collective action waivers in employment con-
tracts, the NLRB has found these waivers constitute an unfair labor practice 
in violation of the NLRA.156  However, in light of the Court’s decisions in 
Concepcion, the circuits have split on whether to adopt or reject the NLRB’s 
interpretation.157 
The NLRB, which is tasked with the enforcement of the NLRA, rou-
tinely decides complaints filed under the NLRA.158  The Court has recog-
nized the NLRB’s role is often to define what constitutes a protected collec-
tive action under Section 7 of the NLRA.159  Before the Court’s more recent 
interpretations of the FAA, the NLRB found in J.H. Stone & Sons160 that 
employer-drafted arbitration agreements requiring employees to individually 
arbitrate employment claims violated employees’ rights under Section 7 of 
the NLRA.161  The Seventh Circuit enforced this order and agreed with the 
NLRB’s finding that arbitration agreements waiving collective action are il-
legal in light of Section 7’s guarantees.162 
After the Court’s decision in Concepcion, the NLRB again addressed 
the issue of class action waivers in D.R. Horton, Inc.163  The NLRB found 
that the employer-drafted arbitration agreement constituted an unfair labor 
practice under the NLRA by barring collective claims and by requiring all 
claims to be brought individually.164  The NLRB reasoned that collective en-
forcement of rights in court or in arbitration serves Congress’s intention to 
equalize the bargaining power of employees and employers.165  Furthermore, 
the NLRB found that its conclusion under the NLRA could be harmonized 
                                                          
 155.  NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984); see also Litton Fin. Printing 
Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 201 (1991) (finding the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA will be 
upheld “so long as it is ‘rational and consistent with the Act.’” (quoting Fall River Dyeing & Fin-
ishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987))).  
 156.  D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2285–87 (2012). 
 157.  See infra notes 172–193 and accompanying text.  
 158.  See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text.  
 159.  Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978) (“It is neither necessary nor appropriate, 
however, for us to attempt to delineate precisely the boundaries of the ‘mutual aid or protection’ 
clause.  That task is for the Board to perform in the first instance as it considers the wide variety of 
cases that come before it.”).  
 160.  33 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1941).  In fact, the scope of the FAA has been expanded so much by 
the Court in recent decades that the NLRB does not even discuss the possibility that the NLRA and 
the FAA are in conflict.  Id. at 1023–24.  
 161.  Id. at 1023 (“The effect of this restriction is that, at the earliest and most crucial stages of 
adjustment of any dispute, the employee is denied the right to act through a representative and is 
compelled to pit his individual bargaining strength against the superior bargaining power of the 
employer.”).  
 162.  NLRB v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942).  
 163.  357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2284–88 (2012). 
 164.  Id. at 2278–80.  
 165.  Id. at 2279.  
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with the FAA so both statutes could be given effect.166  The NLRB reasoned 
that the NLRA’s substantive right to collective action could not be overshad-
owed by the FAA.167  However, the NLRB found that the FAA’s saving 
clause allowed for collective action waivers in arbitration agreements to be 
set aside because an agreement waiving workers’ substantive federal rights 
violated public policy.168  Federal statutes are a manifestation of public pol-
icy, so agreements that violate the terms of a federal statute, such as the em-
ployer-drafted arbitration agreements that interfered with workers’ rights to 
collective action, violate public policy and will not be enforced by the 
courts.169  The NLRB also distinguished its decision from Concepcion.170  
The NLRB argued that, unlike classwide consumer arbitration discussed in 
Concepcion, collective employment arbitration will not sacrifice the princi-
pal advantages of arbitration.171  Collective employment arbitration will 
maintain arbitration’s informality and efficiency because the agreements are 
between employers and their own employees, unlike consumer class actions, 
which the Court in Concepcion feared could involve thousands of potential 
claimants.172 
Following the NLRB’s decision to strike down the employer-drafted 
collective action waiver in D.R. Horton, Inc., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth,173 Second,174 and Eighth175 Circuits rejected the NLRB’s 
interpretation and found collective action waivers enforceable in employment 
contracts.  In D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB,176 the Fifth Circuit asserted that the 
                                                          
 166.  Id. at 2284.  The NLRB recognized that it is responsible for administering the NLRA, not 
the FAA, and when possible conflicts between statutes exist, it must take care to accommodate both. 
Id.  If the two federal statutes are capable of coexistence, both are “given effect ‘absent a clearly 
expressed congressional intention to the contrary.’”  Id. at 2283–84 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 
417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).  
 167.  See id. at 2286 (“[F]inding the [Mutual Arbitration Agreement]’s class-action waiver un-
lawful does not conflict with the FAA, because the waiver interferes with substantive statutory 
rights under the NLRA, and the intent of the FAA was to leave substantive rights undisturbed.”).  
 168.  Id. at 2287.  
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. at 2288.  The NLRB argued that the decision in Concepcion was governed by the Su-
premacy Clause because the case involved a conflict between a state law and the FAA, a federal 
law.  Id. (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)).  Meanwhile, the deci-
sion before the Board involved an apparent conflict between two federal statutes and therefore was 
not governed by the Court’s decision in Concepcion.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 2287.  
 172.  Id.  While contracts of adhesion between consumers and companies may cover thousands 
of potential claimants, employers on average employ twenty employees, and employment claims 
often involve a distinct subset of employees, so the number of potential claimants in employment 
arbitration would be significantly smaller than in consumer arbitration.  Id. 
 173.  D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 174.  Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 175.  Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 176.  737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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NLRB’s decision impermissibly conflicted with the FAA’s policy of enforc-
ing arbitration agreements according to their terms177 and that the right to 
class procedures was a procedural device and not a substantive right.178  The 
Second Circuit, in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP,179 similarly reasoned 
that collective action waivers in arbitration agreements were enforceable due 
to the FAA’s policy commands and a lack of contradictory command in the 
FLSA.180  Additionally, the Second Circuit rejected employees’ arguments 
that filing claims individually would not be economically feasible because 
the cost of pursuing the claim would be more than the potential individual 
recovery.181  The Eighth Circuit in Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.182 similarly 
concluded that the FLSA does not contain a contrary congressional com-
mand, and the arbitration agreement was therefore subject to the FAA’s com-
mand to enforce agreements according to their terms.183 
On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth,184 Ninth,185 and Sixth186 Circuits have, in agreement with the NLRB, 
found collective action waivers unenforceable in employment contracts.  In 
Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., the Seventh Circuit held that collective action 
waivers violate Section 7 of the NLRA,187 are illegal,188 and, therefore, un-
enforceable under the FAA’s saving clause which permits arbitration agree-
ments to be set aside for illegality.189  Similarly, in Morris v. Ernst & Young 
LLP, the Ninth Circuit held class action waivers unenforceable under the 
                                                          
 177.  Id. at 359.  
 178.  Id. at 357.  The court cited decisions finding that the right to bring a class action is a pro-
cedural right, and asserted that even under the NLRA, class actions do not rise to the level of a 
substantive right because there have been decisions finding that there is no substantive right to use 
class actions under employment statutes, such as the ADEA and FLSA.  Id. (first citing Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991); then citing Carter v. Countrywide Credit 
Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004)).  
 179.  726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 180.  Id. at 299.  
 181.  See id. at 298–99 (discussing the unavailability of the effective vindication doctrine in light 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, which held 
plaintiffs could not invalidate a collective action waiver based on the fact that pursuing the claim is 
not worth the expense).  
 182.  702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 183.  Id. at 1052–54.  
 184.  Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).  
 185.  Morris v. Ernst & Young, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 186.  NLRB v. Alt. Entm’t, Inc., 858 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 187.  Id. at 1151.  
 188.  Id. at 1157.  
 189.  Id.  
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NLRA.190  It asserted that its decision was consistent with the policy man-
dates and statutory language of both the NLRA and FAA.191  In NLRB v. 
Alternative Entertainment, Inc.,192 the Sixth Circuit largely adopted the rea-
soning of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits when it enforced the NLRB’s order 
finding an employer’s collective action waiver unenforceable.193 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Court legitimized the use of arbitra-
tion clauses prohibiting collective action in employment disputes.  The five-
justice majority opinion written by Justice Gorsuch held that employer-
drafted agreements requiring employees to individually arbitrate disputes are 
enforceable even though the NLRA guarantees workers the right to engage 
in collective activities for the purpose of mutual aid and protection.194  The 
narrow majority reasoned that the FAA’s saving clause cannot be used to 
invalidate collective action waivers195 and that the NLRA’s Section 7 guar-
antees do not include the right to bring legal claims collectively.196 
First, the majority announced that agreements to individually arbitrate 
should be enforced in keeping with the FAA and “a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements.”197  Justice Gorsuch explained that the 
agreements to individually arbitrate employment disputes should be enforced 
because the FAA was drafted to ensure agreements to arbitrate would be en-
forced “according to their terms, including terms that specify with whom the 
parties choose to arbitrate their disputes and the rules under which that arbi-
tration will be conducted.”198 
Although the FAA’s saving clause provides for the revocation of arbi-
tration agreements on grounds that exist for the revocation of any contract,199 
the Court asserted that it does not provide a ground to invalidate the agree-
ments here.200  The employees argued that the mandatory agreements to in-
dividually arbitrate violated the NLRA and therefore could not be enforced 
                                                          
 190.  Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 981–84 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 191.  See id. at 984–86 (finding the decision consistent with the FAA since the FAA’s saving 
clause permits arbitration to be set aside on the basis of illegality and the agreements at issue fit 
within this exception because they are illegal under the NLRA).  
 192.  858 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017).  
 193.  See id. at 403 (finding that the right to collective action under Section 7 of the NLRA is a 
substantive right that is violated by class action waivers and unenforceable under the FAA).  
 194.  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619, 1622–24 (2018). 
 195.  Id. at 1623.  
 196.  Id. at 1624–25.  
 197.  Id. at 1621 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983)).  
 198.  Id. (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 288, 233 (2013)).  
 199.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 200.  Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1622–23 (discussing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion).  
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because the FAA’s saving clause prohibits the enforcement of illegal agree-
ments.201  The majority disagreed.202  Relying on AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion,203 the majority found that the illegality defense did not provide a 
grounds for invalidating the arbitration agreements under the savings clause 
because “the employees’ argument seeks to interfere with one of arbitration’s 
fundamental attributes.”204  The majority reasoned that courts may not allow 
a contract defense under the savings clause “to reshape traditional individu-
alized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the 
parties’ consent.”205  The Court held that the saving clause of the FAA could 
not be used to invalidate the arbitration agreements since the defense of ille-
gality here would alter the “fundamental,” bilateral nature of arbitration by 
permitting collective arbitration.206 
Next, the Court engaged in a lengthy discussion explaining why the 
NLRA’s Section 7 guarantees do not include a right to collective legal action 
and, therefore, could not invalidate the mandatory collective action waivers 
at issue.207  The employees argued that the last category of protections in 
Section 7208 guarantees a right to collective dispute resolution and, therefore, 
irreconcilably conflicts with the FAA and renders agreements to individually 
arbitrate employment disputes unenforceable.209  The Court reasoned there 
was no conflict between the FAA and Section 7 of the NLRA, citing the 
strong presumption against repeals by implication.210  Additionally, the Court 
adopted a narrow view of the NLRA’s guarantees in Section 7 since the 
ejusdem generis canon mandates that the general terms in Section 7 only en-
compass things similar to the preceding terms.211  To support its contention 
that Section 7 of the NLRA does not contain a right to collective legal action 
                                                          
 201.  Id. at 1622.  
 202.  Id. 
 203.  In Concepcion, the Court held that consumers were not entitled to classwide arbitration 
procedures, despite a state law that prohibited class action waivers in consumer contracts, because 
permitting class-wide arbitration constituted a “‘fundamental’ change” to the arbitration process.  
Id. at 1623 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347 (2011)).  
 204.  Id. at 1622–23 (“But an argument that a contract is unenforceable just because it requires 
bilateral arbitration is a different creature.  A defense of that kind, Concepcion tells us, is one that 
impermissibly disfavors arbitration whether it sounds in illegality or unconscionability.”).  
 205.  Id. at 1623.  
 206.  Id. at 1622–23. 
 207.  Id. at 1624–30. 
 208.  Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees workers the right to self-organization, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives, and “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 209.  Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1623–24.  
 210.  See infra notes 214–216 and accompanying text.  
 211.  See infra notes 218–221 and accompanying text. 
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by employees, the Court cited the “usual rule”212 that Congress does not alter 
details of a regulatory regime in vague terms.213 
The Court explained that the FAA and the NLRA do not conflict be-
cause there is a strong presumption against repeals by implication, and the 
employees did not offer evidence of a “clear and manifest” intention of Con-
gress to displace the FAA with Section 7 of the NLRA.214  The Court rea-
soned that the language of Section 7 of the NLRA does not meet this thresh-
old since the provisions focus on collective bargaining and there is no specific 
reference to arbitration and collective action procedures.215  Therefore, the 
Court found the presumption against repeals by implication must be applied 
in this instance.216  The Court also contended that its decision is in keeping 
with the Court’s tendency to uphold the FAA and avoid conflicts with other 
federal statutes.217 
The Court found that the ejusdem generis canon of construction directs 
that Section 7’s guarantee of a worker’s right to engage in concerted activities 
for “mutual aid or protection”218 must be interpreted narrowly and, therefore, 
does not include a right to collective dispute resolution.219  The ejusdem gen-
eris canon directs that when a general term follows more specific terms in a 
list, the general term is understood to “embrace only objects similar in na-
ture” to the preceding terms.220  The Court reasoned, that since “[n]one of the 
preceding . . . terms speaks to the procedures judges or arbitrators must apply 
in disputes that leave the workplace,” there is no basis to read a right to col-
lective action into Section 7.221  Additionally, the Court found that the 
NLRA’s “broader structure”222 supports this textualist analysis because the 
NLRA does not provide specific procedures to exercise a right to collective 
                                                          
 212.  Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1626–27. 
 213.  See infra notes 222–224 and accompanying text.  
 214.  Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1624 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).  
 215.  Id. Additionally, the majority argued that while some group litigation existed when the 
NLRA was enacted in 1935, class and collective actions “were hardly known” when the NLRA was 
adopted so the drafters of the NLRA could not have intended to protect collective dispute resolution.  
Id.  
 216.  Id.  
 217.  See id. at 1627 (“[W]e’ve stressed that the absence of any specific statutory discussion of 
arbitration or class actions is an important and telling clue that Congress has not displaced the Ar-
bitration Act.” (citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 103–04 (2012))).  
 218.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 219.  Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1625–26. 
 220.  Id. at 1625 (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)).  
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
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dispute resolution,223 and there is a rule that Congress does not alter regula-
tory regimes in vague terms.224  Thus, the Court found that ejusdem generis 
and the statute’s “broader structure” mandate a narrow interpretation of the 
NLRA’s Section 7 right to engage in “concerted activities for . . . mutual aid 
or protection.”225 
Lastly, the Court addressed some of the dissent’s arguments.226  The 
Court attempted to refute the dissent’s criticism that this decision marks a 
return to the Lochner era,227 a time when the Court, based on its own policy 
preferences, regularly overrode legislation designed to protect workers.228  
The majority countered that its decision seeks to honor Congress’s policy-
making role,229 and the majority accused the dissent of retreating to policy 
arguments to support its opinion that the NLRA guarantees workers the right 
to collective dispute resolution.230  Capitalizing on this theme, right before 
the majority set out its judgment, the majority stated, “The policy may be 
debatable but the law is clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agree-
ments like those before us must be enforced as written.”231  Accordingly, the 
lower courts’ decisions in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp. and Morris v. Ernst 
& Young LLP were reversed, and the judgment in Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. 
NLRB was affirmed.232 
The four-justice dissent, penned by Justice Ginsburg, would have held 
that Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees workers a right to collective dispute 
resolution, and therefore the employer-drafted agreements forcing employees 
to individually arbitrate their claims are unenforceable.233  The dissent con-
tended that the legislative history of the NLRA234 and the FAA235 supported 
the employees’ arguments for invalidating the agreements to individually ar-
                                                          
 223.  Id. at 1625–26.  
 224.  Id. at 1626–27.  The Court also reasoned that it does not owe any deference to the NLRB’s 
contrary interpretation of Section 7 of the NLRA because the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA, 
a statute it administers, implicates the FAA, a statute it does not administer.  Id. at 1629.  Addition-
ally, the Court found that deference was not owed to the NLRB’s interpretation because the Court 
was able to resolve the statutory ambiguities using canons of construction.  Id. at 1629–30.  
 225.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1625.  
 226.  Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1630.  
 227.  Id.  
 228.  See id. at 1634–35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing a time in history when courts fre-
quently invalidated legislative efforts to address the imbalance of power between workers and em-
ployers).  
 229.  Id. at 1630 (majority opinion). 
 230.  Id. at 1632.  
 231.  Id.  
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. at 1633, 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 234.  Id. at 1634–35. 
 235.  Id. at 1643.  
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bitrate.  The legislative history of the NLRA directs that the NLRA be inter-
preted to embrace a right to collective dispute resolution,236 since Congress 
framed Section 7 broadly so that the NLRB could interpret it in accordance 
with changing employment practices.237  Meanwhile, the FAA was originally 
intended to apply only to commercial disputes, not employment agree-
ments.238  The dissent asserted that “[i]n recent decades, th[e] Court has 
veered away from Congress’ intent,”239 and its overreaching application of 
the FAA had led the NLRB to confront whether there is a conflict between 
the NLRA and the FAA.240 
Although the dissent disagreed with the Court’s recent interpretations 
of the FAA, Justice Ginsburg argued these decisions do not “compel the de-
structive result the Court reach[ed]” in this case.241  Concepcion and the 
Court’s other FAA decisions prohibit the FAA’s saving clause to be used in 
a way that discriminates against arbitration “either by name or by more subtle 
methods.”242  However, the dissent reasoned that NLRA’s guarantee does not 
discriminate against arbitration on its face or by more subtle methods since 
the NLRA applies to all employer-drafted contracts equally.243  Therefore, 
even in light of the Court’s recent decisions, the dissent asserted that the sav-
ing clause of the FAA could be invoked to invalidate the agreements here on 
the ground of illegality.244  Even if the Court had viewed the NLRA and the 
FAA as incompatible, the dissent contended that the NLRA should control 
since it was enacted later in time and as the more specific statute, cannot “be 
controlled or nullified by a general one.”245 
The dissent ended with a discussion of the consequences of the Court’s 
decision, namely the underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed 
to protect workers246 and abuse of vulnerable workers at the hands of unscru-
pulous employers.247 The dissent observed that the Court’s decision will 
                                                          
 236.  Id. at 1636–37 (“Recognizing employees’ right to engage in collective employment litiga-
tion and shielding that right from employer blockage are firmly rooted in the NLRA’s design.  Con-
gress expressed its intent, when it enacted the NLRA, to ‘protec[t] the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association,’ thereby remedying ‘[t]he inequality of bargaining power’ workers faced.” 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012))).  
 237.  Id. at 1640.  
 238.  Id. at 1642–43. 
 239.  Id. at 1643.  
 240.  Id. at 1644–45.  
 241.  Id. at 1645.  
 242.  Id. (quoting id. at 1622 (majority opinion)).  
 243.  Id. at 1646. 
 244.  Id.  
 245.  Id. at 1646 (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)). 
 246.  Id.  
 247.  Id. at 1647–48. 
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likely have a freezing effect on private claims248 and widen the existing “en-
forcement gap.”249  In turn, employers who realize that employees may not 
be able to mount a legal challenge to seek redress for wage-and-hour viola-
tions may decide to skirt legal obligations.250  Justice Ginsburg concluded, 
“[i]f these untoward consequences stemmed from legislative choices,” the 
Court should be obliged to honor them, but the Court’s decision did not stem 
from a congressional command.251  The dissent would have reversed Murphy 
Oil and affirmed Lewis and Ernst & Young.252 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The “bitter irony” for the modern American worker is that they have 
“more rights and less protection than ever.”253  Congress has enacted more 
laws to protect workers,254 but the reality is that few workers are represented 
by unions, 255 and government agencies do not have sufficient capacity to 
enforce these laws.256  These institutions that could provide a counterweight 
to corporations and employers’ power in the workplace are presently lacking.  
Moreover, private enforcement efforts have been weakened by the growing 
trend toward employer-favored mandatory arbitration, which  bars access to 
                                                          
 248.  Id. at 1647.  
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Id. at 1647–48.  The dissent also noted that the Court has recognized the centrality of group 
action to the effective enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes, and the same logic holds true for 
the enforcement of wage-and-hour laws.  Id.  
 251.  Id. at 1648.  Instead, the dissent argued that the majority’s decision was “the result of take-
it-or-leave-it labor contracts harking back to the type called ‘yellow dog,’ and of the readiness of 
this Court to enforce those unbargained-for agreements.”  Id. at 1648–49.  
 252.  Id. at 1649. 
 253.  Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The 
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1050 (1996); see also Matthew W. 
Finkin, The Meaning and Contemporary Vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 93 NEB. L. REV. 6, 
29 (2014) (noting that as unions have declined, positive law has sought to fill the vacuum, but these 
protections could be undermined by employer-drafted arbitration agreements).  
 254.  See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 253, at 1019 (“There are a myriad of federal and state 
laws that give employees substantive rights and protections—protections for whistle-blowers, pro-
tection against racial and gender discrimination, rights to be free of lie-detector tests, rights to be 
free of sexual harassment, rights to a safe and healthy workplace, and protection against unjust 
dismissal through various modifications of the at-will rule, and so forth.”).   
 255.  U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY, 2018 (2019) 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (providing unionization numbers for 2018, in-
cluding overall unionization rate of 10.5% and private sector rate of 6.4%). 
 256.  See Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left to Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates That 
Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1112–14 (2012) (not-
ing a decline in federal enforcement of wage and hour laws, delays in federal investigations, and 
general lack of funding and staffing for enforcement efforts at the state and federal levels).   
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courts that would otherwise enforce workers’ employment rights.257  Amid 
this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 
further weakens private enforcement efforts by giving its imprimatur to em-
ployer-drafted clauses requiring employees to individually arbitrate 
claims,258 a controversial practice259 that had been growing steadily in the 
wake of the Court’s recent decisions strengthening the FAA.260 
This Note argues that the Court’s decision, couched in textualist analy-
sis, arbitrarily applies ejusdem generis in a manner that is contrary to the in-
tent of the NLRA.261  Meanwhile, the Court erroneously expanded the scope 
of the FAA in this decision by defining arbitration as a fundamentally bilat-
eral rather than collective process.262  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s 
policy rationales for bilateral arbitration overwhelmingly benefit employers 
at the expense of millions of American workers by insulating corporations 
from liability for wage-theft.263 
A.  The Court’s Decision Improperly Narrows Workers Rights Under 
Section 7 by Selectively Applying Canons of Statutory Construction 
and Ignoring the Intent of the NLRA 
In relying heavily on textual analysis and selectively applying canons264 
of statutory construction,265 the Court unduly constrained its analysis to ar-
rive at a result that is contrary to the purposes of both the NLRA and the 
FAA.  The Court concluded that the NLRA’s Section 7 guarantee that work-
ers be permitted “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
                                                          
 257.  ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION 1–2 (2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitra-
tion (finding employees subject to mandatory arbitration agreements have risen from just over two 
percent in 1992 to over half of private sector nonunion employees, 60.1 million workers, in 2017).  
 258.  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 259.  COLVIN, supra note 257, at 6 (noting that “class action waivers are one of the most contro-
versial features of mandatory arbitration procedures”).  
 260.  Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Manda-
tory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1344–45 (2015) 
(noting that arbitral class action prohibitions more than doubled from 2012 to 2014, rising from 
16.1% to 42.7%, and management-side attorneys describe the AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant decisions as an opportunity for companies 
to avoid expensive class actions).  
 261.  See infra Section IV.A.  
 262.  See infra Section IV.B.  
 263.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 264.  A canon of construction is defined as a “rule used in construing legal instruments, 
esp[ecially] contracts and statutes . . . .  Also termed rule of construction; rule of interpretation; 
principle of interpretation; interpretive canon.”  Canon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 265.  See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1625–29 (2018) (applying the ejusdem 
generis canon and citing the NLRA’s “broader structure” in order to support the conclusion that the 
NLRA does not encompass a right to collective legal action).  
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collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”266 does not include 
the right to bring collective legal actions against their employers.267  Thus, 
the Court decided, there is no conflict between the NLRA and FAA, and in 
keeping with the “liberal federal policy” favoring arbitration, the arbitration 
clauses at issue must be enforced according to their terms.268  The Court mis-
used its authority by selectively applying the ejusdem generis269 canon of 
statutory construction to narrow the scope of rights protected under Section 
7, despite the existence of canons of construction that would yield the oppo-
site result270 and the histories of the NLRA271 and FAA.272 
1.  The Court Selectively Applied Ejusdem Generis Despite 
Alternative Canons 
The Court misused its authority by selectively applying ejusdem generis 
to narrow workers’ rights under Section 7.  The Court has noted in the past 
that “[l]ike many interpretive canons . . . ejusdem generis is a fallback, and if 
there are good reasons not to apply it, it is put aside.”273  In Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, Justice Souter pointed out that specific terms preceding 
a general catchall term should not always be interpreted as limiting the 
broader language.274  Justice Souter noted that sometimes it is appropriate to 
interpret general terms at the end of a list according to the ex abundati cau-
tela, abundance of caution, canon of statutory construction.275  Ex abundati 
cautela recognizes that the “existence of a special reason for emphasizing 
specific examples of a statutory class can negate any inference that an other-
wise unqualified general phrase was meant to apply only to matters ejusdem 
generis.”276 
                                                          
 266.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 267.  Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1625. 
 268.  Id. at 1621 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983)).  
 269.  The ejusdem generis canon directs that when a general term follows more specific terms 
in a list, the general term is understood to “embrace only objects similar in nature” to the preceding 
terms.  Id. at 1625 (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)).  The 
Court reasoned, since “[n]one of the preceding . . . terms speaks to the procedures judges or arbitra-
tors must apply in disputes that leave the workplace,” there is no basis to read a right to collective 
action into Section 7.  Id.  
 270.  See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 271.  See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 272.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 273.  Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 138 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting); e.g., 
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991) (explaining that 
the ejusdem generis canon does not control when the whole context dictates a different conclusion).  
 274.  Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 138–40 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 275.  Id.  
 276.  Id. at 140; see also Fort Stewart Sch. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 646 
(1990) (referencing the ex abundati cautela canon as a potential explanation to the exceptions listed 
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Thus, the specificity of the subjects277 preceding the phrase “mutual aid 
or protection”278 in Section 7 of the NLRA can be understood as listed in the 
statute in an abundance of caution.  The NLRA was enacted, in 1935, to ad-
dress the imbalance of power in employment relations279 and specifically to 
prohibit the use of employer tactics, such as yellow dog contracts,280 which 
sought to prohibit employees from joining unions and other forms of collec-
tive action as a condition of employment.281  Thus, while the drafters of the 
NLRA could have simply written Section 7 to read, “[e]mployees shall have 
the right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection” and 
thereby encompassed protections for unionization and collective bargaining, 
the drafters chose to specifically list those activities before the “mutual aid 
or protection”282 phrase because those activities had been most immediately 
and prominently attacked by employers.283  It is illogical to assume that Con-
gress sought to limit the protections of workers to collective bargaining and 
labor unions by specifying the existing tactics of unscrupulous employers and 
concluding with a broad guarantee of workers right to concerted action for 
“mutual aid or protection.”284  That assumption is especially flawed given 
that draftsmen of the NLRA’s predecessor specifically chose language with 
the “broadest possible sweep”285 in order to account for the “almost endless 
array of legal games” employers could use to thwart collective action.286  
Thus, although the ex abundati cautela canon of statutory construction would 
honor both the text and the intent of the NLRA, the Court chose to limit the 
scope of the NLRA’s Section 7 protections by using the ejusdem generis 
                                                          
in a statute because the exceptions were “technically unnecessary”); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 
668 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. granted on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 2688 (2012) (in-
voking the ex abundati cautela canon of construction “which teaches that Congress may on occasion 
repeat language in order to emphasize it” (citing Fort Stewart Sch., 495 U.S. at 646)). 
 277.  See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining . . . .”). 
 278.  Id.  
 279.  See supra notes 130–134 and accompanying text.  
 280.  In 1932, the NLRA’s predecessor, the Norris LaGuardia Act (“NLA”), was specifically 
enacted to make yellow dog contracts unenforceable by the courts.  29 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012).  
Section 7 of the NLRA converted Section 2 of the NLA, which limits the courts, into restraints on 
employers.  Finkin, supra note 253, at 21.  
 281.  E.g., Van Wezel Stone, supra note 253, at 1037 n.146 (describing the Court and Congress’s 
reactions to “yellow dog” contracts). 
 282.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 283.  See supra notes 278, 280–281.  
 284.  29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 285.  Finkin, supra note 253, at 14. 
 286.  Id. at 14–15 (quoting DANIEL JACOBY, LABORING FOR FREEDOM: A NEW LOOK AT THE 
HISTORY OF LABOR IN AMERICA 62 (1988)).  
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canon.287  The Court could have used the ex abundati cautela canon to har-
monize the NLRA and the FAA instead of using the ejusdem generis canon.  
Had the Court used the ex abundati cautela canon, it would have found that 
NLRA protects a broad range of collective actions, including collective legal 
actions, making agreements to individually arbitrate illegal and unenforcea-
ble under Section 2 of the FAA.288 
While implied repeals are generally disfavored,289 the Court could have 
found a direct conflict between the FAA and NLRA since “[t]he labor law-
based right to collective adjudication (and the corresponding bar to com-
pelled waiver of that right) stands in direct opposition to the bilateral concep-
tion of arbitration that has emerged in the Court’s most recent FAA jurispru-
dence.”290  When two federal statutes conflict, the later enacted statute, here 
the NLRA, would be impliedly understood to repeal provisions in the earlier 
enacted statute291 “under familiar principles of statutory construction.”292  In 
that case, “[w]hile the NLRA lacks a comparable express repealer, Supreme 
Court interpretive methodology requires the finding that it too, as the later-
enacted law, repeals the FAA pro tanto.”293  Therefore, the Court arbitrarily 
chose to use one canon of construction to the exclusion of viable alternatives 
to arrive at the conclusion that Section 7 of the NLRA does not guarantee 
workers the right to bring collective legal actions. 
                                                          
 287.  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1625 (2018).  
 288.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 289.  See Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1624 (noting the strong presumption against finding an implied 
repeal when the courts interpret allegedly conflicting statutes).  
 290.  Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action In-
cludes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1038 (2013).  
 291.  E.g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (noting that repeals 
may be implied if necessary to make a later-enacted law work); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. United 
Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 582–83 n.18 (1971) (noting that in the event of an irreconcilable 
conflict, the more specific provisions of the later-enacted statute would prevail); Posadas v. Nat’l 
City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (noting that the later-enacted statute repeals provisions of 
earlier-enacted laws to the extent they irreconcilably conflict).   
 292.  Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 402 U.S. at 582–83 n.18.  
 293.  Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 290, at 1039; see also Finkin, supra note 253, at 23; Brief of 
Amici Curiae Maryland, et. al. Supporting Respondents in Nos. 16-285 & 16-300 and Petitioner in 
No. 16-307 at 4, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (Nos. 16-285, 16-300, 16-307) 
(“Even if the Employers’ interpretation of the Arbitration Act were correct, however, that statute 
would yield to the NLRA and NLA.  These two later-enacted labor statutes, not the Arbitration Act, 
govern whether employers may dictate the terms under which their employees can join to-
gether . . . .”).  
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2.  The Court’s Constrained Textual Analysis of Section 7 Disregards 
the Intent of the NLRA and Countervailing Considerations of 
Public Policy 
Though textualist approaches are not inherently flawed, when the 
Court’s “refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text enables it to disregard 
countervailing considerations that were expressed by Members of the enact-
ing Congress and that remain valid today, the Court misuses its authority.”294  
In this instance, the Court relied heavily on textualist analysis, without con-
sidering the underlying purposes of the NLRA,295 the limited initial scope of 
the FAA, and the countervailing considerations of public policy. 
In this decision, the Court’s textual analysis ignores the history of the 
NLRA and Congress’s intentions to address the imbalance of power between 
employees and employers by broadly granting workers the right to join to-
gether to address workplace grievances.296  Prior to the NLRA, workers, as a 
condition of their employment, waived their rights to join unions in em-
ployer-drafted yellow dog contracts and were, therefore, forced to present 
any workplace grievances they had individually.297  The NLRA and its pre-
decessor sought to end this practice but framed employees’ rights more 
broadly to bar any agreement or practice that interfered with employee con-
certed action.298  Today, as unions have declined, individual employment 
rights in federal statutes have become a new source of protection and bar-
gaining power for employees.299  Yet, workers face an all-too-familiar assault 
on their ability to contract freely when they are presented with mandatory 
arbitration agreements that require them to waive their right to bring collec-
tive actions as a condition of employment.300  In fact, the “contract terms 
designed to deter employees from pursuing their interests by collective action 
                                                          
 294.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 295.  See, e.g., Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 649 
(2005) (“A text means what its author intends.  There is no meaning apart from intention.  There is 
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BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 78 (2014).  
 300.  Van Wezel Stone, supra note 253, at 1037 (“Today’s ‘yellow dog contracts’ require em-
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of the past, the new mandatory arbitration provisions are often imposed on workers without even 
the illusion of bargaining or consent.” (footnote omitted)).  
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are precisely the kind of yellow dog-like provisions Congress sought to com-
bat in enacting the Norris LaGuardia Act and the NLRA.”301  Collective ac-
tion waivers achieve the same effect as the yellow dog contracts Congress 
sought to eliminate302 in that they limit employees’ ability to join together 
and wield their collective strength against their employer. 
Therefore, the Court’s conclusion that “concerted activities for . . . mu-
tual aid or protection”303 in Section 7 of the NLRA does not encompass col-
lective legal action is at odds with the purpose of the NLRA and New Deal 
reforms that sought to empower workers to vindicate their rights and interests 
in employment matters.  It is also at odds with the NLRB’s interpretations, 
which have repeatedly been met with judicial approval,304 and with the Su-
preme Court’s own interpretation of Section 7 rights in Eastex, Inc. v. 
NLRB,305 when the Court explicitly found that Section 7 protects workers 
collective action in judicial and administrative forums.306  Thus, a collective 
or “class action lawsuit easily comes within the existing interpretation of con-
certed activity.”307  The Court misused its interpretive authority by ignoring 
these powerful indications of congressional intent and the NLRB and courts’ 
expansive interpretations of Section 7. 
This constrained analysis of Section 7 also ignores the realities of the 
workplace308 and undermines legislation designed to protect workers.309  Un-
derstaffed and underfunded state and federal agencies rely on the ability of 
workplace employees to enforce their rights through private enforcement ef-
forts.310  Private enforcement is essential to the vindication of workers’ rights 
because government “enforcement efforts are, at best, merely scratching the 
surface of potential violations.”311  Yet the Supreme Court’s decision ignores 
                                                          
 301.  Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 290, at 1066.  
 302.  See supra notes 279–281 and accompanying text. 
 303.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 304.  See supra notes 145–152 and accompanying text; see also Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 
290, at 1029 (noting “the [NLRB] has consistently held, with repeated judicial approval, that the 
NLRA protects the right of employees to join together to pursue workplace grievances through 
litigation and arbitration”).  
 305.  437 U.S. 556 (1978). 
 306.  See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text.  
 307.  Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 204 (2003).  
 308.  Noah Feldman, This Is What a More Conservative Court Looks Like, BLOOMBERG (May 
22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-22/this-is-what-a-more-con-
servative-supreme-court-looks-like.  
 309.  Van Wezel Stone, supra note 253, at 1043 (reasoning that “compelled arbitration of statu-
tory claims threatens to nullify all employee protection legislation” because protections may be 
disregarded by employer-designated arbitrators and the private nature of arbitration prevents effec-
tive public review and accountability).  
 310.  Brief of Amici Curiae Maryland, et. al., supra note 293, at 5. 
 311.  Id.; see also supra note 256.  
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this reality and the fact that these unbargained for collective waivers will lead 
to widespread underenforcement of workers’ rights.  One study of the present 
“epidemic of wage theft” found that in three major U.S. cities, low-wage em-
ployees lost an estimated $3 billion in legally owed wages a year.312  Workers 
faced with arbitration clauses waiving all collective claims as a condition of 
their employment or continued employment do not have a real choice in 
whether to accept the agreement or not.313  Without the ability to aggregate 
claims, workers, especially low-wage workers with relatively small individ-
ual claims, will not be able to afford to bring claims in arbitration.314  As 
documented in the consumer context, collective action waivers in arbitration 
make it so that very few claims are filed at all.315  Therefore, the Court’s 
decision to endorse collective action waivers in the employment context will 
suppress the number of claims made and hinder private enforcement of work-
ers’ rights.316 
Perhaps even more troubling, without the threat of collective claims 
from their employees, companies may be tempted to underpay and overwork 
employees, as the benefits of skirting legal obligations would outweigh the 
costs of compliance.317  Thus, the Court’s decision ignores these realities 
about government enforcement efforts, the effects of collective action waiv-
ers on claims, and the cost-benefit analyses businesses undertake when eval-
uating legal obligations.  In essence, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion was written 
                                                          
 312.  BRADY MEIXELL & ROSS EISENBREY, ECON. POLICY INST., AN EPIDEMIC OF WAGE 
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ness/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html (“Verizon, which has 
more than 125 million subscribers, faced [sixty-five] consumer arbitrations in [2010 to 2014], the 
data shows.  Time Warner Cable, which has 15 million customers, faced seven.”).  The data demon-
strates that arbitration agreements barring collective claims have insulated corporations from liabil-
ity in the consumer context.  Id.  
 316.  See generally Sternlight, supra note 260 at 1344–45 (noting that arbitral class action pro-
hibitions doubled from 2012 to 2014 in the wake of the Court’s Concepcion and American Express 
decisions, and that employers know that similar prohibitions in the employment context will greatly 
reduce employers’ exposure since very few individual employees will bring claims).  
 317.  The Supreme Court Sides with Companies over Arbitration Agreements, ECONOMIST (May 
23, 2018), https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2018/05/23/the-supreme-court-
sides-with-companies-over-arbitration-agreements.  
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as if the Court “lived on the moon, with no knowledge of the realities of labor 
relations or the politics of class actions.”318 
By confining its analysis, the Court has used textualism as a vehicle for 
its own policy preferences in favor of arbitration at the expense of workers’ 
rights and well-being.  Justice Breyer summarized concerns about con-
strained textual approaches in his dissent in Circuit City, when he noted: 
[T]he “minimalist” judge “who holds that the purpose of the statute 
may be learned only from its language” has more discretion than 
the judge “who will seek guidance from every reliable source.”  A 
method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, 
and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent 
with a court’s own views of how things should be, but it may also 
defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted.  That is 
the sad result in this case.319 
B.  The Court Erroneously Expanded the Scope of the FAA to Permit 
Class Action Waivers Despite a Lack Support for This Outcome in 
the FAA’s Text and History 
Similarly, the Court misused its authority regarding the FAA when it 
reasoned, based on its recent precedents, that allowing collective actions in 
arbitration would be counter to “one of arbitration’s fundamental attrib-
utes,”320 namely its “individualized and informal nature.”321  This conclusion 
does not flow from the FAA’s text, which says nothing of the form arbitration 
should or must take, but rather from the Court’s recent decisions322 that have 
found that arbitration should be bilateral unless the parties agree otherwise.323  
This presumption in favor of bilateral arbitration is derived from the Court’s 
                                                          
 318.  Feldman, supra note 308. 
 319.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 62 (Y. Kauffman trans., 1989) (1987)).  
 320.  Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018).  
 321.  Id. at 1623.  
 322.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. An-
imalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2010).  
 323.  Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in 
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2890–91 (2015) (noting nothing in the text 
of the FAA describes the form arbitrations should take, but in 2010, Justice Alito introduced the 
term “bilateral arbitration” into the FAA case law “when ruling that silence in a contract about the 
availability of class arbitration could not be taken by arbitrators as the basis for authorizing a class 
process”).  
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own notions of efficiency and cost-effectiveness and lacks doctrinal sup-
port.324 Therefore, by finding that collective action conflicts with the FAA’s 
fundamental attribute of bilateralism, the Court continues the trend in its FAA 
jurisprudence of “standing on its own shoulders”325 as it builds its own ver-
sion of the FAA, which is divorced from the intent and text of the statute at 
the time of its enactment.326 
Furthermore, a requirement for bilateral arbitration in employment mat-
ters would not find support in an examination of the FAA’s legislative intent, 
and Epic is readily distinguishable from the Court’s recent decisions requir-
ing bilateral arbitration.  A requirement of bilateral arbitration in employment 
disputes is not supported by the legislative intent of the FAA since Congress 
intended for arbitration to occur voluntarily between parties of equal bargain-
ing power.327  In fact, because Congress intended arbitration to occur between 
parties of roughly equivalent bargaining power, permitting employees to col-
lectively arbitrate claims would be consistent with the legislative intent of the 
FAA.328  And the Court’s bilateral arbitration preference should not hold in 
the employment context given the express congressional guarantee for work-
ers to engage in collective action for “mutual aid or protection,”329 a right that 
has not been present in the Court’s decisions requiring parties to submit to 
arbitration individually.330 
                                                          
 324.  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 362 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where does the majority get its 
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tion?  The majority does not explain.  And it is unlikely to be able to trace its present view to the 
history of the arbitration statute itself.” (citation omitted)).  
 325.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rea-
soning that the Court’s professed policy favoring arbitration is its own creation that “has given [the 
FAA] a scope far beyond the expectations of the Congress that enacted it” (citation omitted)).  
 326.  C.f. Moses, supra note 295 at 113 (“The Court has, step by step, built a house of cards that 
has almost no resemblance to the structure envisioned by the original statute.  Each card put in place 
by the Court builds on the prior flimsy court-created structure.”).  
 327.  See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text; see also Sternlight, supra note 260, at 
1316–17 (“Indeed, commentators have convincingly argued that Congress did not intend for the 
[FAA] to cover employees.”).  
 328.  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 362 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that aggregate consumer 
claims against corporations would be consistent with the FAA’s intent that arbitration occur be-
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arbitration agreements invalid in the employment context, despite its decision in Concepcion, be-
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right to collective pursuit of workplace grievances).  
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C.  The Court’s Generalizations About Bilateral Arbitration’s 
Efficiency Do Not Hold True for Employees Seeking to Bring 
Claims Against Employers 
In essence, through its series of pro-arbitration decisions, including 
Epic, the Court has legislated its own policy preferences in favor of expansive 
arbitration.331  However, the generalizations that have been used to justify the 
Court’s support of collective action waivers in arbitration clauses, namely the 
Court’s view that bilateral arbitration is more cost effective, informal, and 
expeditious as compared to class arbitration,332 may be true for employers 
and corporations,333 but those justifications do not hold true for employees 
seeking to bring claims.  In fact, the Court’s recent FAA jurisprudence334 
seems to only be concerned with protecting corporate defendants from in-
creased liability, while ignoring the detrimental effects its decisions will have 
on the ability of employees and consumers to effectively vindicate claims.335  
In sum, “[f]or low-wage workers fearful of losing their jobs, and faced with 
a growing wage theft epidemic, the notion that the U.S. Supreme Court is 
mostly concerned with defendants’ right to be free from potentially expensive 
litigation is disappointing.”336 
Certainly, if the Supreme Court was concerned about cost-effectiveness 
and efficiency of dispute resolution from the perspective of the employees, it 
would find in favor of workers’ rights to bring collective legal proceedings 
and bar collective action waivers in employment.337  For workers, in order to 
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secure legal representation, it is more cost-effective and practical to aggre-
gate their small claims, which alone would not be worth arbitrating, with 
other workers’ similar claims.338  Likewise, it is more efficient for multiple 
claims based on similar evidence to be resolved in one proceeding, which 
obviates the need to resolve the same issue repeatedly and prevents incon-
sistent adjudications.339  It is also more cost-effective and efficient for work-
ers to proceed collectively so that no one complainant will have to shoulder 
the personal and financial costs of pursuing the claim, including hours assist-
ing in the investigation,340 the costs of legal representation,341 and potentially 
any retaliatory actions by the employer342 alone.  Additionally, “arbitration’s 
perceived informality is illusory for low-wage workers if they are unable to 
afford the significant costs of private arbitration.”343 
These theoretical barriers have borne out in empirical assessments of 
mandatory arbitration, which have found that mandatory arbitration prevents 
access to justice for employees and consumers.344  If mandatory arbitration 
truly is a more convenient, efficient, and expeditious forum for dispute reso-
lution, one would expect to see claims filed at a greater rate than they are 
filed in litigation, but that is not the case.345  A recent study found that while 
approximately 60.1 million American workers are subject to mandatory ar-
bitration agreements, there are only about 1880 mandatory employment ar-
bitration cases filed each year nationally so that only one in 32,000 employ-
ees actually files a claim under these procedures.346  Researchers have 
attributed this small number of claims to a variety of factors, including the 
presence of class and collective action prohibitions, which makes litigating 
small sums unfeasible.347  As more businesses adopt collective action prohi-
bitions in light of the Epic decision, it is easy to imagine that even less work-
ers will file claims.348  A further decrease in the number of claims filed should 
provide the Court with a clear indication that arbitration is only efficient in 
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the sense that it provides corporations with a powerful tool to insulate them-
selves from liability at the expense of workers’ rights and wellbeing. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Supreme Court held that the 
NLRA’s guarantee that workers be able to engage in “concerted activities 
for . . . mutual aid or protection”349 does not include the right to bring legal 
claims collectively in an arbitral forum.350  In doing so, the Court endorsed 
collective action waivers in mandatory arbitration agreements, a controver-
sial practice that has been growing in popularity among corporations and 
other employers as a way to deter the filing of claims.351  The Court’s deci-
sion calls for legislative intervention352 because it is a clear departure from 
the intent of national labor laws,353 ignores the challenges workers face in 
enforcing widespread wage-theft,354 and further expands the scope of the 
FAA beyond the text355 and intentions of the original statute for the benefit 
of powerful corporate defendants.356  
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